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![]() What can behavioural science tell us about designing retirement options and defaults? Stew Patterson considers the implications with insights from behavioural experts. Auto-enrolment has been a success because doing nothing was the easiest thing for pension scheme members to do. Inertia drove participation, investment defaults drove outcomes, and most people ended up better off. Auto-enrolment succeeded in part by removing the need for people to make pensions an active priority. |
By Stewart Patterson, Head of Innovation, LifeSight, WTW Yet at retirement, we currently try to reverse that logic, asking people who are not pension experts to make complex decisions about how to turn a finite pot of money into an income for an uncertain lifetime. Guided Retirement seeks to take the success of auto-enrolment beyond retirement age, into 'decumulation'. The case for doing so is not simply one of convenience. It is a response to predictable features of human behaviour, and to a retirement system that currently asks members to make some of their most difficult financial decisions at precisely the point when the consequences are hardest to judge. Under Guided Retirement, trustees of DC pension schemes will need to provide a default pathway designed to turn members' savings into a regular income for life. Members who want something different will still be able to choose an alternative. This creates an unusual challenge at retirement. As behavioural psychologist and Behaviour Consulting founder Paul Davies puts it: "We pay into a pension for all our life. You get your annual statement and some people read them. A lot of people don't. Many don't actually engage with it until that point in life where suddenly they have to make a decision and all this money that they've saved has to then become an income for the rest of their life." The problem is compounded by the nature of retirement decisions themselves. Sujatha Krishnan-Barman, Principal Advisor at the Behavioural Insights Team and co-author of their recent report for the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, Defined contribution guided retirement: a behavioural perspective, notes: "There is little opportunity to learn by doing, and little opportunity to learn from others, since outcomes are private and heterogeneous." “Information competes for scarce attention; more of it can mean less understanding.”Sujatha Krishnan-BarmanBehavioural Insights Team Information alone isn't enough
Sujatha says: "Information competes for scarce attention; more of it can mean less understanding." She adds: "The difficulty is not primarily that members lack information. It is that the system has not made the choices legible: easy to compare, easy to time well, and easy to tell good from bad."
Paul agrees: "Forced engagement is not the same as informed engagement. Inertia made auto-enrolment a success, not financial education, not engagement, and not personalisation. And that's what I think is going to be the powerful aspect here as well." “Inertia made auto-enrolment a success, not financial education, not engagement, and not personalisation.”Paul DaviesBehavioural Psychologist, Behaviour Consulting That distinction matters for retirement design. If the underlying problem were simply a lack of knowledge, the answer might be better information, education and tools. But if some of the difficulty comes from predictable features of human decision-making, providing more information cannot by itself resolve it. The design of the choices, and the point at which members are required to make them, matter too. How behaviour shapes retirement decisions
Sujatha notes: "People overweight immediate and certain rewards relative to distant and uncertain ones. BIT's pension transfer trial showed this experimentally: a £100 cashback offer significantly increased intentions to transfer, even where the transfer left people worse off within five years."
"At a human level, people are worried about running out of money in their retirement," says Paul. "People don't evaluate retirement income on average outcomes. They look at the worst-case scenario and try and avoid that. This is why retirees underspend relative to what they can afford, because they're terrified of the downside. Continuing to make financial decisions through retirement is also daunting. The cognitive burden of ongoing financial decision-making in later life – when circumstances are changing, when cognitive capacity may be declining – is significant. Products that say "make a decision once and it keeps working" have a psychological value that doesn't appear in the financial modelling." Sujatha further notes: "Any design element that requires an active member decision in later life should either be automated, defaulted, or supported by evidence that the decision actually gets made." Taken together, these behavioural challenges point towards a different starting point for retirement design. Rather than asking how schemes can persuade every member to engage sufficiently to make good decisions, the first question should be what happens when they do not. A retirement pathway that only works well for an engaged member risks being poorly designed for precisely the people most likely to rely on it. “Any design element that requires an active member decision in later life should either be automated, defaulted, or supported by evidence that the decision actually gets made.”Sujatha Krishnan-BarmanBehavioural Insights Team The trustee dilemma
That does not make the case for a default straightforward. In many respects, it transfers the difficulty of the decision. Defaults may reduce the decision burden on members, but they increase the responsibility placed on trustees. Trustees must choose pathways suitable for groups of members, despite having limited information about individual circumstances – and knowing that no default will perfectly suit everyone.
The behavioural case for defaults therefore creates an important governance tension. Trustees may be understandably reluctant to make decisions on behalf of members that put them into irreversible retirement products. But preserving flexibility also embeds an assumption: that members will engage later and exercise that flexibility effectively. Paul says: "Defaults are immensely powerful. The choice of what the default is, is a real responsibility." Sujatha says: "The members who most need a protective default overlap with those on whose behalf trustees feel least entitled to make an irreversible decision. The natural instinct is to preserve optionality, but flexibility is not neutral. It is a design that assumes members will engage at some later date. The unengaged, by definition, tend not to." Designing defaults for real people
There is a further challenge for trustees: the members whose behaviour is easiest to observe may not be representative of those for whom the default matters most.
"Pension schemes should really be designing defaults for the people they don't hear from very much," says Paul. "Every piece of member research is biased towards people who engage with their pension, because those are the people who respond to surveys, attend webinars, and talk to advisers. The people who will most rely on a well-designed default are precisely those you never hear from." Sujatha points to automatic enrolment: "It did not make people more knowledgeable or more engaged; participation was transformed while engagement stayed low. It worked because the choice architecture was redesigned so that the path of least resistance led to a good outcome." The lesson is not that member engagement is undesirable. It is that good outcomes should not depend upon it. That shifts the role of engagement: from being the mechanism through which the retirement system works, to a way for members to understand the pathway provided for them and, where appropriate, choose something different. Members need enough clarity to feel comfortable, and enough choice to feel in control. Paul adds: "Pension schemes need to be confident to communicate simply: here is your default path, here is why it's designed for people like you, here is what you'd need to do if you want something different. And then stop talking. People also want to feel in control of their decisions while still being guided. The design challenge is to give people a clear, well-chosen default, but show it alongside alternatives. The default does the heavy lifting, but the presence of options preserves the sense of agency." What does this mean for Guided Retirement?
Guided Retirement will not succeed by turning members into pension experts. The behavioural case points instead towards designing for people as they actually are: creating a clear and defensible path that works for those who do nothing, while making alternatives visible for those who need or want a different route.
That does not remove the difficult decisions; it changes who needs to make them, and when. What should the default seek to achieve? How much individual variation can it reasonably accommodate? When should members be prompted to make an active choice, and when should the pathway do the work for them? These are questions trustees will need to confront as Guided Retirement develops. Behavioural science does not provide all the answers. But it does suggest an important starting point: the success of retirement provision should not depend on members behaving like pension experts.
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